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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impacts of the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme. The goal of
this paper is to help improve the design of cash transfers. First of all, I analyze whether the cash
transfer positively affects child health variables despite occurring in a region with poor supply
side health institutions. I find significant results for many child level variables, such as frequency
of illnesses, but insignificant improvements in anthropometric measurements. Secondly, I
examine whether female-headed households invest more in child health than male-headed
households. The results show that the impacts of the cash transfer did not depend on the sex of
the household head. This result provides some evidence that females do not always have
systematically different preferences for expenditure on children than males. The paper uses the
imperfect randomization of the cash transfer in combination with difference-in-differences
regressions, propensity score matching, and Lee Bounds tests in order to ensure the robustness of
the results.
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1. Introduction

The intergenerational transfer of poverty is an especially distressing occurrence.
The consequences of poor nutrition and health remain with children for the entirety of
their lives. Dr. Martorell (1997) outlined the long term effects of malnutrition for
children; reduced IQ, physical growth, increased behavioral problems, decreased
attention, and lower educational achievement. These effects persist throughout life and
occur even among children without the clinical signs of malnutrition. Poor health even
reduces the ‘basic capabilities’ that Amartya Sen (1999) shows are crucial to having an
acceptable quality of life and escape poverty.
Many aid programs, such as the UN’s World Food Program, try to address the
immediate causes of poor health by increasing food and nutrition intake. These programs
might be failing to address some of the underlying causes. Poor health and nutrition are
caused by poverty, inequality, food insecurity, and an inability to access supply side
institutions. According to Leroy et al. (2009), cash transfer programs could address both
the underlying and direct causes of childhood malnutrition. Cash transfers were first
popularized in South America and have since expanded throughout the world. The
transfers provide regular cash payments, often conditional on certain behaviors. The
purpose of these programs is to encourage investment in human capital while at the same
time providing aid to the poor. Proponents of these programs view cash transfers as
preferable to in-kind transfers because they can cause fewer market distortions and
provide the poor with more expenditure flexibility. The majority of the programs are
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contingent on health and education-seeking behavior, especially in the cases of children
and pregnant women.
Mexico’s Progresa program (later renamed Oportunidades) was the first
comprehensive national conditional cash transfer program. Oportunidades provides cash
transfers to households with additional benefits for children enrolled in school. It also
offers nutritional supplements and incentives for preventative care and now serves over
six and a half million families. This program has been extensively studied due to the fact
that the program began with a staggered rollout that provided economists with an
experimental counterfactual. Gertler (2000) finds a reported reduction of sickness in the
previous four weeks of 4.2 percentage points for children under the age of three. Gertler
(2004) finds that children whose families had received Oportunidades were taller and
were 25.5% less likely to be anemic. Van de Gaer et al. (2013) notes positive impacts of
the Oportunidades program on anthropometric measures with the results being most
pronounced for poor indigenous children.
Many other countries have started similar programs. For example, Brazil
implemented its Bolsa Familia program, which focuses on incentivizing education. Other
South American countries have followed suit as well, such as Chile, Columbia,
Honduras, and Peru. The success of these programs has inspired countries outside of the
Americas to begin implementing their own cash transfer programs. A key component of
many of these programs has been targeting transfers towards females because it is
believed that women are more likely to spend the transfers on improving the well-being
of their children (Quisumbing et al., 1995).
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Lagarde et al. (2009) conducted a comprehensive review of the literature on many
of these cash transfer programs and their impact on the health status of household
members. The surveys that they included in their reviews were of a high standard. Most
were performed under either experimental or quasi-experimental conditions and the
resulting papers contained minimal methodological flaws. They find that the cash
transfers increased the use of health services and improved nutritional status as well as
anthropomorphic health indicators. However, they do not find evidence of effects on
health care expenditure. They conclude that it is unclear as to whether these programs
would produce similar results without conditional elements or whether most of the
beneficial effects are simply a result of the additional spending power from the cash
transfer. According to Davis et al. (2012), there still remain significant unanswered
questions as to what the effect of the conditional elements of cash transfers are. Lagarde
et al. (2009) end their review by stating that the replicability of their results needs to be
tested under different conditions; specifically in deprived settings such as in areas of subSaharan Africa. They note that the lack of effective primary care facilities might alter any
health outcomes of conditional cash transfers. Cash transfers help households by
providing cash to generate demand, but supply side issues might prevent improvements
in health if there are not adequate health facilities.
Recently, several African countries have created their own cash transfer programs
and begun research to evaluate whether or not the programs are effective. These
programs are fundamentally demand side solutions. They encourage the use preventative
medicine and the accumulation of education, but if effective supply side institutions do
not exist then they might prove to be ineffective. Many countries lack the proper
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infrastructure, especially in rural communities where the need is most dire. Monitoring
the conditionality of the programs creates further constraints because it imposes
additional costs and requires a professionalized bureaucracy.
The goal of this paper is to bridge this gap in the literature by examining the effect
of cash transfers in Malawi, a country that lags the Americas in terms of infrastructure.
The Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme (SCTS) provides an ideal opportunity to
access the efficacy of cash transfers without strong conditional elements. Approximately
22% of the population lives in ultra-poverty, spend almost all of their income on food,
and fail to consume an acceptable minimum caloric intake. These people constitute the
poorest of the poor in an underdeveloped country. The SCTS is targeted at the neediest
10% of the population with the goal of reducing ultra-poverty rates in the country to 10%
by 2015. The program is effectively unconditional, though its recipients are encouraged
to use the cash transfer for educational purposes. They also receive additional funds
based on whether or not the household contains school-aged children. These cash
transfers are also not specifically targeted towards females.
I use the quasi-experimental conditions of the SCTS program to test if cash
transfers significantly improve the health of children even in the absence of strong
conditional elements. Propensity score matching and differences-in-differences
techniques allow me to correct for any flaws in the experimental design. Moreover, I
examine whether female household heads have systematically different expenditure
preferences than male household heads. I generally find positive impacts on child health.
For example, the percentage of children who were sick in the last month decreased by 9.4
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percentage points and I find a decrease in the number of respondents who said they were
unable to seek care by 6.4 percentage points. Unfortunately, I do not find improvements
in anthropometric measurements (such as height for age, weight for age, and bmi for
age). There also seems to be no systematic difference in expenditure preferences for
female and male headed households. This finding does not prove females in general do
not have systematically different preferences. Instead, it provides evidence that it is
important to consider the cultural context rather than assuming that it is always better to
provide the cash transfers solely to females.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the theory and data,
respectively. The methodology and results are discussed in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6.
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2. Theory

2.1 Program Theory Framework

There are multiple channels through which cash transfers might improve the
health and nutrition of children. Leroy et al. (2009) outline the major pathways through
which cash transfers can improve the health of children. They begin by outlining the most
basic mechanisms through which the cash transfer programs can work; increased
purchasing power for the household, the provision of fortified products, education of
household decision makers about health and nutrition, and conditional elements, such as
having to attend school or visit health clinics. Leroy et al. also include various
intermediary pathways. For example, the increased purchasing power might free
additional time to care for household members or it might allow the household to
purchase food with higher nutritional content.
These are all elements common to many cash transfer programs and therefore it
has been difficult determining what mechanism is the most effective. The cash transfer in
Malawi is particularly helpful in this debate because it does not include conditional
elements and it does not provide any nutritional supplements. Therefore the Malawi cash
transfer should only affect the nutrition and health of children through the increased
spending power that it gives households. It is important to discover if the cash transfers
are primarily effective through this pathway because monitoring requirements add
additional costs to the program as well as decreasing the uptake rate. If there are
significant impacts on the nutrition and health of children in the Malawi SCTS then it
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shows that providing poor households with increased purchasing power might be an
effective way to improve child health outcomes in countries with poor supply side
infrastructure.

2.2 Household Decision Making

There is also the theoretical question about whether a household should be treated
as a single unitary decision making entity. If this assertion is true then the recipient’s
gender should not be a factor, but there have been both theoretical reasons and empirical
reasons to reject his model of household decision making. Manser and Brown (1980)
developed a model of intra-household bargaining. They recognized that different
individuals in the household have different preferences and that household decisions are
bargained results. The distribution of power in a household (whether power from income
or from social norms) effects what decision is reached. If males and females in a
household have systematically different preferences then the gender of the recipient of
the cash transfer might be pertinent. Giving the cash transfer to the female in a household
theoretically increases her bargaining power. If the females systematically prefer
expenditures on the well-being of children in comparison to men, then the most effective
solution to increase the human capital accumulation for children is to give the transfers to
females.
Chiappori (1988) created a theoretical model for shocks to non-labor income,
such as a cash transfer. The household is composed of H members. Every household

8

member receives non-labor income in the current period of yth. They can purchase at pt a
vector of goods (q1,…., qN). His model assumes that there is no borrowing or saving from
one period to the next for the sake of simplicity. The utility of each member of the
household depends on the consumption bundles purchased by every other member in the
current period and on an individual specific shock Єth with mean Єh.

The household will maximize

such that

=

=

for t=1,…,T. Duflo (2000) uses this model as a basis to examine whether the gender of
recipients of a South African pension scheme affects the impact on grandchildren. Duflo
shows how a permanent exogenous shock in non-labor income affects the household
member’s weight in the optimization problem by increasing the member’s outside
options. If women have systematically different preferences than men, an exogenous
shock to the non-labor income of a female should have different effects on child health
than an exogenous shock to the non-labor income of a male.
There has been research suggesting that females do have systematically different
preferences. Thomas (1990) finds that income from assets owned by women significantly
and positively affects child nutrition and health as well as leading to larger expenditure
shares for health, nutrition, and housing (Thomas 1994). Lundberg et al. (1997) use a
natural experiment created by a change in the mode of allocating child benefits in the
United Kingdom from a tax credit to a direct payment to the mother. They find that the
change was associated with an increased share of expenditure on women’s and children’s
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clothing relative to men’s clothing. Duflo (2000) also finds that the gender of the cash
transfer recipient in the South Africa pension scheme affected outcomes. When the
recipient was female, the anthropometric measurements of grand-daughters of the
recipients improved. Duflo warns that care must be taken when generalizing the results;
difference in social and cultural norms could influence outcomes.
If the gender of the recipient does matter, then it does not necessarily mean that
cash transfers to females produce more desirable results. There have been many papers
showing that giving cash transfers to women has positive impacts on the well-being of
household members1, but many of these studies lack a proper male counterfactual
(Gutierrez et al., 2011). Gutierrez et al. examine an unconditional cash transfer to older
adults in Mexico City and find that the gender of the recipient created different effects.
Transfers to females resulted in higher household expenditures on children while giving
the transfer to males increased school enrollment rates.
The hypothesis that females have systematically different preferences is tested in
this paper by examining if the impact of the cash transfers on child health is
systematically different for similar male and female headed households. If the impact is
significantly different, then it provides evidence that the hypothesis is correct. The fact
that ultra-poor female headed households might be systematically different than ultrapoor male headed households for unobservable reasons does complicate the answer.
However, even if they are the results could still provide evidence that it is more effective
for the cash transfers to be targeted at female-headed households. It is important to note
1

See for example Thomas (1990), Rubalcava and Contreras (2000), Glewwe and Olinto (2004), Maluccio
and Flores (2005), and Attanasio et al. (2009).
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that this paper is not testing whether the cash transfer affects intra-household bargaining;
rather it is testing the underlying assumption that females have systematically different
preferences than men.
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3. Data

3.1 Program Description

The Malawi SCT program began in 2006 in the Mchinji district of Malawi. The
goal of the program was to eventually expand to the national level. The Mchinji district
pilot program allowed the government to assess the design of the program as well as to
conduct an impact evaluation. The impact evaluation relies on the randomized phase-in
of the program. In order to qualify for the program households had to be labor
constrained, which was defined as the household lacking able-bodied adults between the
ages of 19 and 64 or having a dependency ratio2 worse than three. It was also necessary
for the households to be ultra poor, which was defined as consuming one meal or fewer
per day and lacking valuable or productive assets. Several factors influenced the size of
the cash transfer received. Households received a base transfer of $4.30 per month and an
additional $2.85 per household member up to four total members. An additional $1.42 for
every primary school aged youth and $2.85 for every secondary school aged youth was
provided to recipient households. These cash transfers lacked explicit conditions; that is,
there were no monitoring requirements like those found in many South American cash
transfer programs. Recipients of the cash transfers did receive some social marketing
promoting the use of the cash transfers for health and education. The average recipient
household received approximately $14 a month. In the Mchinji district, this transfer was
large enough to raise the income of recipients from the lowest decile to above average
2

For the purposes of the SCT the dependency ratio was defined as the sum of children younger than 19, the
elderly older than 64, and the number of chronically ill or disabled adults aged between 19-64, all divided
by the number of able-bodied adults aged 18-64 (Miller et al., 2011)
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(Miller et al., 2008). Therefore this transfer represents a very significant infusion of cash
into recipient households. While many cash transfer programs have larger absolute
transfers, this program has a much larger transfer relative to typical earnings in the
community compared to other programs in Africa (Ghana, Mozambique, Kenya, and
Zambia) and cash transfer programs in other parts of the world (Jamaica, Mexico, and
Columbia) (Osei et al., 2012).
This paper analyzes household, adult, and child level data from an impact
evaluation survey administered in 2007-2008. The survey assessed the effect of the pilot
SCT program in the Mchinji district of Malawi. Eight Village Development Groups
(VDGs) were chosen to participate in the survey. The eight VDGs are comprised of a
total of 23 villages and each VDG has roughly 1,000 member households. Four of the
VDGs were randomly chosen to be part of the treatment group and began receiving the
transfer in 2007 immediately after being administered the baseline survey. The other four
VDGs were assigned to the control group with eligible households receiving transfers in
2008 after the final survey was administered.
In each of these VDGs, Community Social Protection Committees (CSPCs)
ranked households to determine their eligibility status. The goal of the program was to
provide cash transfers to the neediest 10% of Malawian households. Over 10% of the
population in these groups met the uniform national eligibility criteria to be included in
the program. The ranking process at the local level conducted by the CSPCS played a
critical role because only 10% of households in the VDGs could receive the transfer. The
total number of households deemed to be eligible ended up being 802 because each VDG

13

group contains roughly 1000 households and there were eight groups. Only eligible
households, in both the treatment and control groups, were surveyed and they were
visited up to three times to ensure the completion of questionnaires (Miller et al., 2011).
Take-up rates were near universal because the SCT was unconditional.
There were three rounds of surveys. The baseline questionnaire was administered3
in March 2007 which was just prior to commencement of treatment, the midline
questionnaire was administered in September 2007, and the endline questionnaire was
administered in April 2008 just before the control group received their first cash transfer.
The baseline and endline surveys were both administered after the December-March
rainy season when food stores have been exhausted in the ‘hunger season’. The midline
survey was administered during the harvest season when households have a relative
abundance of food from the recent harvests. A total of 751 households completed all
three rounds of questionnaires. Fifty-one eligible households, 6% of the original sample,
were excluded from analysis because they did not complete all three rounds of the
survey.4

3.2 Differences Between Control and Treatment Groups for Independent Variables

The surveys contain a variety of detailed information on demographics, health,
education, income, and expenditures. There are a considerable number of questions
3

The Boston University Center for International Health and Development in conjunction with the Center
for Social Research of the University of Malawi administered the survey and was responsible for the survey
design and data entry.
4
Twenty-three of the households were lost due to death. Therefore only twenty-eight households failed to
complete the survey for other reasons, which is only 3.5% of the original sample.
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specifically relating to health and nutrition, including data on the types of food
consumed, anthropometric measures (e.g., height and weight), expenditures related to
health, sickness, disabilities, and general physical well-being. The questions varied
slightly across the rounds of the survey with a general trend of adding more detailed
questions in later rounds.
There were only eight VDGs that were randomized, which provides only 800
households. The national eligibility criteria were rather strict and straightforward.
Unfortunately, due to more than 10% of households meeting the eligibility criteria in the
Mchinji district, the final selection took place at the community level. Different
communities placed emphasis on slightly different household characteristics when
ranking the households. These differences create some baseline differences between the
treatment and control households (Miller et al., 2008). If there were a larger sample of
VDGs the selection criteria should be on average relatively similar because there is no
reason to believe that the randomized treatment and control VDGs employ systematically
different selection criteria. The small number of communities means that care needs to be
taken to examine the variation in baseline characteristics. Statistical methods are required
to control for any significant variations in characteristics between treatment and control
households. These statistical methods are discussed in detail in Section 4.
First, this paper establishes the validity of the counterfactual and examines any
relevant differences between the control and treatment groups. There are two main types
of relevant variables for this analysis, (i) the program eligibility criteria, and (ii) general
variables on basic characteristics of the household and the household members. These
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baseline summary statistics are shown in Table 1. T-tests are used to see if there are
statistically significant differences in the baseline characteristics of the control and
treatment groups.
Table 1 reveals there are significant differences in baseline characteristics across
the treatment and control groups. These differences are especially pronounced for
household demographic structures. For the variables related to eligibility criteria,
treatment households are significantly more likely to have relied upon begging at some
point. They are also much more likely to have a dependency ratio above three. The
treatment households are also more likely to have experienced natural shocks in the form
of droughts or floods between 2005 and 2007. This susceptibility to natural disaster might
explain why treatment households are more likely to have resorted to begging. Control
households, on the other hand, tend to be older and less educated.
These differences show that concerns related to the small number of Village
Development Groups are valid. The CSPCs in the treatment group seemed to prioritize
households with orphans and higher dependency ratios, while those in the counterfactual
seemed to prioritize the elderly. Because younger Malawians are more likely to have had
access to education, these differences in prioritizations also explain the gap in education
levels of the household heads. These differences persist in the adult level data with adults
in the treatment group being younger and better educated on average. These differences
demonstrate the need to use statistical tools to account for these differences in order to
ensure unbiased results. These adjustments are discussed in detail in the methodology
section.
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Control households anticipating their future receipt of the cash transfer might
systematically alter behavior in the control group. These households knew that they were
eligible to receive the transfer at a later date. Due to the program being new and not
widely known, the exact details of the program are unlikely to be well known. There is
also some uncertainty in the households as to whether they would actually receive the
cash transfer in the future. Therefore the anticipation effects do not seem likely.
Additionally, the main effect of anticipating the cash transfer would be to increase
expenditure in these households as a form of consumption smoothing. This increased
expenditure would actually decrease observed effects and if positive health benefits are
discovered, then the possible existence anticipation effects should increase the robustness
of the results.

3.3 Dependent Variables

Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the child level variables being
analyzed. A variety of variables related to health and nutrition are used to examine the
impacts of the treatment. The first group of variables consists of respondent reported
measures of health. An adult respondent would answer the questions for the children in
the household. The first question analyzed is whether the child has been sick in the past
month. If the child had been sick, the respondent was asked what the child had been sick
with. The most common illness was malaria so a variable was included measuring its
prevalence. Malaria is also a useful indicator. Because simple measures, such as buying
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mosquito nets, can be used to reduce its risk, it can serve as an indicator if households are
using the cash transfer to invest in precautionary measures.
The next question captures whether the child has been sick over a month. The
purpose of this variable is to see if the household tries to get treatment for recurrent
illnesses after receiving the cash transfer when they previously have not. A relevant
follow-up is if the household failed to seek any form of treatment for their previous
illness (any type of medicine or help whether ‘Western’ or traditional) and another
variable indicating if the household failed to get treatment because of a lack of money.
The next several variables try to assess the impact of illness by asking if the child
had to stop normal activities because of illness or if others had to stop activities to care
for the sick child. Both of these questions are followed up by questions asking the
number of days that activity was stopped. Ideally, the cash transfer should reduce the
necessity of stopping activities by preventing disease or increasing resilience, but there
might be other effects as well. The cash transfer might reduce the opportunity cost of
stopping regular activities, which could result in longer periods of inactivity due to
illness. The results will tell whether either of these effects dominates the other.
The next set of variables consists of anthropometric variables. The survey team
conducted several types of measurements for the members of the household. First, they
weighed every child in kilograms. Next for children under the age of two, the survey
team measured the length of the child laying down in centimeters. Finally, for children
over the age of two, the survey team measured the child’s standing height. There are
slight differences between measuring the length of a child and measuring the height of a

18

child (on average around .7 cm according to the WHO reference population), but this
discontinuity is easily corrected. Henceforth, height is used to refer to both height and
length measurements.
The height of a child represents the long run health and nutrition of a child.
Height at any given age for a child represents years of accumulated investments that the
household has made in nutrition and health (Martorell and Habicht 1986). Therefore,
stunting and other height related problems represent years of undernourishment. Weight
is much more variable in the short run and is most likely to provide evidence of
improvement with the intervention. There are several issues with simply using weight to
analyze the impact of the program. Weight is heavily dependent on height and age as well
as nutrition. Therefore, this paper primarily uses a constructed Body Mass Index (BMI)
calculated by weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared.
The analysis utilizes a reference population developed by the WHO. This
reference population represents what child growth should be under ideal circumstances,
i.e., those with minimal constraints to growth. The WHO recently undertook a major
project in order to create a set of growth standards for children under the age of five. This
was because of criticism that the old NCHS study from 1977 represented children of only
one country with a limited ethnic background. Therefore, the WHO set out to answer
these criticisms. They studied numerous children raised in six different countries under
optimal conditions.5 After they determined that the ethnicity was not a crucial factor for
5

They studied 8,440 children under the age of five in Ghana, the United States, Brazil, India, Norway and
Oman to check if results were consistent across ethnicities using advanced statistical techniques, such as.
All of the children came from optimal conditions; breastfeeding, good diets, prevention and control of
infections, the mother did not smoke, and healthcare was provided (WHO Child Growth Standards 2006).

19

the countries chosen, they merged the data set with the 1977 NCHS study to create
consistent standards from birth to age nineteen. To ensure the validity and continuity of
the combined sample, the Box-Cox Power Exponential method is applied along with
appropriate diagnostic tools.6
The reference population is used to estimate how far these children are from ideal
growth in height, weight, and BMI. Following the lead of other researchers, such as
Duflo (2000), height for age, weight for age, and BMI for age z-scores are constructed.
These scores are constructed by subtracting the median of the reference population for
the relevant age and gender and then dividing the result by the standard error of the
relevant reference population.7 Unfortunately, weight for age z-scores could only be
constructed for children younger than ten years old. The age groups used are by age in
months and gender which allows relatively granular and specific assessment. The primary
issue with this approach is that the results are based on changes in z-scores, which makes
interpreting the exact level of impact difficult. But, the main concern is whether there is
an effect since the beneficial effects of nutrition and health on weight and height are
cumulative and therefore increase over time.

6

For more details please see pages and articles at
http://www.who.int/growthref/growthref_who_bull/en/index.html.
7
For data and a detailed guide of how to replicate this process along with useful STATA tools please use
http://www.who.int/growthref/tools/en/ for children aged 5-19 and
http://www.who.int/childgrowth/software/en/ for children from birth until five years of age.
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4. Empirical Approach and Results for Child Health Outcomes

While there are, on average, some differences in targeting methods between the
treatment and control groups, the random assignment of communities along with the
application of national eligibility criteria suggests that the groups do not radically differ
from each other. They do not have productive or valuable assets, they lack food security,
and they live in ultra-poverty. Despite these strong similarities, econometric techniques
are used in order to create a more valid counterfactual. This paper utilizes two
approaches; a difference-in-difference estimator and matching approaches. Because the
variation between the counterfactual and treatment groups are due to variations in
targeting criteria, rather than due to self-selection or other primarily unobservable
characteristics, the variation should be linked to observable demographic characteristics.
This paper uses data on these observable characteristics in order to create a valid
counterfactual. I also use a Lee Bounds test in order to ensure the robustness of the
results.
This section is structured as follows; first I outline theoretical basis of the
difference-in-difference and propensity score matching methodology. I then apply these
techniques to the general child health results. Next, I outline the difference-in-difference
and linear combination framework used for determining if results differ by household
gender; followed by the results. Finally, I discuss Lee Bounds tests and present the results
from these tests.
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4.1 Difference-in-difference

First, a difference-in-difference, or double difference (DD), method is used. The
purpose of the DD method is to control for time-invariant unobservable differences at the
baseline in case there are problems with the experiment’s random design (Ravallion,
2005; Gertler et al., 2011). The DD estimator regression framework is as follows:

chit  0  1 postt   2treatment i  1 postt * treatment i  1 X i   2 Z it   it
where chi is the child health indicator variable of interest for child i in time t, postt refers
to whether the data is from pre (t=0) or post (t=1) treatment (post treatment is used
exclusively to signify data from round three 8 ), treatmenti indicates that the child i
belongs to a household in the treatment group, X is a vector of baseline observable
characteristics of the household that the child i belongs to, as well as time invariant
demographic characteristics of the child. I control with baseline characteristics because
the communal selection process was conditioned on these baseline characteristics. Z is a
vector of time variant demographic characteristics of the child, such as age. εit is the error
term.
The community selection processes resulted in a counterfactual that differed in
statistically significant manner from the treatment group. For instance, the treatment

8

Round one and round three are one year apart and are therefore more directly comparable than round two
which occurred six months after the treatment began. Seasonality plays an important role in the results
because round one and round three are during the ‘hunger’ season directly before the harvest while round
two is after the harvest and occurs when food is relatively plentiful. Additionally, Bertrand et al. (2004)
note issues with standard error consistency for DD estimations using many time periods of data so this
problem is circumvented by relying solely on a pre and post treatment measurement.
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communities prioritized households with orphans and higher dependency ratios while the
counterfactual prioritized the elderly. These differences should be controlled by Xi which
captures baseline observable characteristics of the household. The regression also
includes the conditioning variables in Xi (such as meals per day and the lack of valuable
or productive assets), which should improve both the accuracy and the precision of the
results (Stock and Watson, 2003).
A variety of household level controls are used, including: eligibility criteria,
household head years of schooling, age of household head, whether the household head is
elderly, an interaction between a household head’s educational attainment and the elderly
household head dummy, and an interaction term for additional elderly household
members when the household head is elderly. I also use some basic demographic
characteristics, such as age in months and gender, though there is a lack of child level
specific conditioning variables. A probit regression model is used on all dummy
variables.9 For all count variables I use a linear regression model. Lastly, all standard
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.10
The coefficient δ1 controls for aggregate factors that would cause a change in chit
even in the absence of treatment. δ2 captures possible differences between the treatment

9

Ai and Norton (2003) raised concerns over the inclusion of interaction terms in nonlinear regression
models. A recent paper by Puhani (2012) addressed these concerns by noting that it is appropriate to focus
on the sign of interaction terms for nonlinear difference-in-difference models and he notes that the
coefficient provides an estimate of treatment effects with the nonlinear transformation rule. I checked
whether using an OLS regression provides similar results in order to ensure the robustness of our results
and they are similar both qualitatively and quantitatively.
10
Because there are eight VDGs, estimating cluster-robust standard errors at the VDG level may seem to be
appropriate. However, Cameron et al. (2008) find that for small numbers of clusters (between five and
thirty) clustered standard errors are too large. This leads to a greater likelihood of rejecting the hypotheses.
Further, it is not possible to use cluster robust standard errors with the matching procedures. In order to be
consistent across models, and because the possible overestimation issues with cluster-robust standard
errors, I use robust standard errors.
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group and the counterfactual pre-treatment. Finally, β1 is our DD estimate of the impact
and should capture the effect of the cash transfer upon treatment households.

4.2 Propensity Score Matching

DD estimates should be able to create statistically reliable results because the
regressions have adequate controls and the difference between treatment and control
groups are based on observable characteristics. However, in order to ensure the
robustness of the results this paper also relies on matching techniques. Propensity score
matching (PSM) with kernel weighting is used to test the robustness of the overall results.
Kernel weighting means that closer neighbors are weighted more than those neighbors
with more distant PSM Values.11
PSM uses probit or logit models in order to calculate the predicted probability of a
household receiving treatment based on observable characteristics;

As explained by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the function e(x) is the propensity
score and it gives the propensity towards exposure to treatment given the baseline
observed covariates x. These probabilities are used to match households with similar
propensities (e(x)) in order to create a valid counterfactual. This technique is most
effective when groups differ solely based on observable characteristics (x) that can be
used to match them. For testing overall results, the matched households have their results

11

A variety of matching specifications were performed in order to check the accuracy and robustness of the
results, including using five nearest neighbor matching. These results were broadly consistent with those
from kernel weighting.
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compared (for gender-related results households without adequate matches are simply
excluded rather than matching households and examining the differences in results). PSM
has been shown to provide experimental conditions by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998), as
well as Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002), as long as the matching is accurate (no
unobservable differences). Because the Malawi data has a variety of covariates on
observable differences and differences are based on observable characteristics, the
matching should effectively create close to experimental conditions and therefore an
accurate indicator of the effects of treatment. Since village development groups are
randomly assigned to control and treatment groups, PSM should be especially effective at
creating experimental. The results of the probit regression that was used to calculate
propensity scores are presented in Annex 1. All of the estimates use bootstrapped
standard errors with fifty repetitions in order to ensure the reliability of the standard
errors. This approach should also account for the fact that the propensity score is
estimated (Diaz and Handa 2006).
The procedures developed by Abedie and Imbens (2011) are used in the PSM
process that allow for biased-corrected estimates of average treatment effects. The
matching procedure and the PSM procedure use the same set of confounders and the
standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.12
For general results of impact, matching is used in combination with DD meaning
that the matching is capturing differential trends over time rather than final differences in
levels. This approach should control for any time-invariant characteristics at baseline that

12

The PSM procedure using the Stata command psmatch2 with standard errors calculated using
bootstrapping . The five nearest neighbor matching used the nnmatch command developed by Abedie et al
(2004) and includes the bias adjustment and calculation of robust standard errors.
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are not adequately controlled for. These results are generally consistent with the standard
DD results with only slight changes in magnitude.
Table 1 shows that the baseline characteristics of the treatment and control groups
after adjustment using kernel weighted propensity score matching. No statistically
significant differences remain for baseline characteristics after PSM. The scores are also
divided into five blocks so that balancing tests could be performed in order to check for
consistency across covariates in each block. This additional step checks to make sure that
households with similar characteristics are matched together. Otherwise it might be
argued that households with similar propensity scores might have the same score (since
all of the controls are distilled into one number) for systematically different reasons and
therefore present an invalid counterfactual. Without significant balancing issues, it seems
as though the matching creates a valid counterfactual.

4.3 General impact of treatment on child health outcomes

Table 4 contains the results of the DD and Kernel PSM regressions. The results
are generally consistent across both approaches. The results for other PSM specifications
are consistent as well and are available upon request. There seems to be somewhere
between a nine percentage point and thirteen percentage point decrease in the number of
respondents reporting that their child has been ill in the last month. Unfortunately, there
is no corresponding decrease in malarial rates. Malaria can be recurrent so there might be
residual effects of previous illnesses before the cash transfer even if the household has
taken precautionary measures. There is a slight decrease in the number of children ill for
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longer than a month, but it is only statistically significant at the 10% level and only for
the DD specification. If a child is sick for over a month, that might indicate more severe
health problems that could require better supply side institutions to fix.
Treatment households are more likely to access medical care of any form. The
results are significant at the 1% level across specifications. The DD method calculated a
6.4 percentage point decrease in respondents not seeking care for a child when sick and
the Kernel PSM approach calculated a 9.2 percentage point decrease in the same variable.
According to the Kernel PSM approach this decrease might be due to better being able to
afford preventative care, but the DD results are inconclusive.
There is also a statistically significant decrease in children reporting that they
have to stop regular activities because of illness, as well as a decrease in the number of
days they stopped regular activities for when sick. Missing fewer days to sickness also
decreases the number of days missed of school. There is also a highly statistically
significant decrease in the likelihood that other members of the household have to stop
their regular activities to care for a sick family member. Both regression specifications
calculated effects of similar magnitude with roughly 22 percentage point decreases.
The next section is the anthropometric results. These measures would provide the
strongest indicator of improvements in health and nutrition because they are definitively
measured and therefore not susceptible to respondent error. All of these variables are
measured by z-scores created using a WHO ideal growth reference population (see data
section for details). Unfortunately, it seems as though none of these variables have any
statistically significant changes. This is perhaps not unexpected given the sample under
consideration. In particular, height represents accumulated investment in nutrition and
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health. Skeletal growth is most variable for those under five years old. Therefore, a
sample containing older children is unlikely to manifest any change. Ideally, there would
be a large sample of very young children. Unfortunately, this paper has to rely on a larger
sample that includes older children.13
There might be several reasons for these results. First of all, it might be that the
time period of one year is too short. This might be especially true because other papers
(Covarrubias et al. 2012) have shown that these households invested heavily in their
productive output. The final round of surveying was before the year’s harvest and
therefore the households have not reaped the returns of their productive investments yet.
The new crops harvested might improve their dietary diversity and caloric intake
significantly. The additional investment in their land plots might also have required extra
household work because of barriers to outside hiring. This extra work might have drained
extra calories from the household. Secondly, the household might simply not have
invested heavily enough in the health and nutrition of the children to produce statistically
significant results. Without conditions and monitoring, the adults who received the
transfer might have elected to spend more of it on their own well-being. Finally, there
might be supply side constraints on the quality of food and nutrition. While the household
might be able to purchase larger quantities of food, they might not have access to food
with higher nutritional quality. Maize is overwhelmingly the crop and food of choice in
Malawi. Therefore it might be harder to improve the nutrition and health of children.

13

The height and weight variables were not only tested by using constructed z-scores in order to ensure that
the lack of results was not due to a specific methodology. I also ran DD regressions on weight, height, and
BMI without relying on z-scores, as well as creating measurements of thinness and severe thinness based
on WHO standards and running the regressions on these variables. The results were similarly not
statistically significant.
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Overall it seems as though there are some positive results of the cash transfer.
There is a sharp reduction in the number of children sick in the past month, a large
reduction in the number of children who do not receive care, a reduction in the number of
children forced to stop regular activities, and a major drop in the number of respondents
reporting that others had to stop regular activities to care for children.

4.4 Linear combination and DD framework for gender specific results

This section seeks to answer whether different genders have systematically
different preferences for expenditure on children. Unlike many other cash transfers, the
Malawi SCTS was not targeted at a specific gender. Around 65% of the households
containing children are female headed. It is possible to see if female-headed households
have systematically different preferences by using linear combination tests on the impact
of the cash transfer. The exact DD specification I use is as follows:

chit   0   1treatment i   2 femhhhi   2 femhhhi * treatment i   1 postt   2 postt * treatment i
  3 postt * femhhhi   4 postt * femhhhi * treatment i   1 X i   2 Z it   it
where femhhh is a dummy variable with one indicating that the household head is female
and 0 indicating the household head is male. The linear combination used was (  4 -  3 )-(

 2 -  1 ). (  4 -  3 ) captures the difference between treated (  4 ) and untreated (  3 )
female headed households post treatment. (  2 -  1 ) captures the difference between
treated (  2 ) and untreated (  1 ) male headed households post treatment. The impact for
male-headed households (  2 -  1 ) is then subtracted from the impact for female-headed
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households (  4 -  3 ) in order to determine which gender of household heads had the
largest impact on the health of children in the household. Finally, tests are run to
determine if the difference in impacts is statistically significant.

4.5 Results for impact differences between male and female headed households

The results of these linear combination tests are presented in Table 5. The only
statistically significant result was the fact that male headed households had a larger
reduction in malarial rates than female-headed households. The lack of clear results is an
interesting finding. Most cash transfers in South America are targeted towards females
because they are assumed to have systematically different preferences and they are
assumed to prefer investing in their children. In this case, it seems as though femaleheaded households are not specifically investing more in their children.
There might be several reasons for this lack of a difference. First of all, the
transfers are being given to female headed households rather than females within a
household. Females as part of a larger household might be seen as primarily responsible
for domestic tasks in more traditional societies. Therefore, the role that they have might
shape their expenditure preferences. If they are seen to be primarily responsible for
domestic tasks then this perceived societal responsibility might shape their expenditure
preferences. These female headed households have to handle the full range of household
responsibilities, including production, and therefore might have preferences shaped by
these more general responsibilities.
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This result highlights the cautious approach that Duflo (2000) encourages in
regards to making assumptions about an individual’s preferences solely based on gender.
She highlights the fact that care must be taken when generalizing her results that cash
transfers to grandmothers improved the anthropometric measures of their granddaughters. The cultural context plays a large role in shaping these preferences.

4.6 Lee Bounds

This paper also uses Lee Bounds tests in order to further ensure the robustness of
the results. It is used for treatment evaluation problems where problems such as nonresponse, sample attrition, or other structural problems might skew the results. It helps
the researcher make sure his or her results are valid by creating upper and lower bounds
on the possible treatment effect. As long as the treatment effect is still statistically
significant for the lower bound then the results remain valid even in the worst case
scenario.
This technique was developed by Lee (2009) for analyzing the impact of the Job
Corps program. He wanted to assess whether the program improved the wage rate of
participants. Unfortunately, the issue of sample selection arises. The same issue can arise
with the cash transfer. The health benefits are only observed for children who remain in
the household and the cash transfer incentivizes households to keep children by
increasing benefits for each child. The transfer might also decrease the risk of attrition
through child death or household dissolution from the household head dying. Those who
are induced to stay are the ‘marginal’ group while those children who would have been in
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the household anyways are the ‘infra-marginal’ group. By examining the selection
probabilities of the control and treatment groups one can determine the possible size of
the marginal group (n). Assuming a worst case scenario that all members with the highest
health benefits are members of the marginal group (n) an upper bound on the child health
effect is created. By assuming that all members with the smallest health benefits are
members of n, a lower bound on the child health effect is created.14 As long as the upper
bound on the effects of the intervention in the Malawi SCTS is still statistically
significant then the results should be accurate regardless of any attrition or non-response
effects. It must be remembered though that this bound represents a ‘worst case’ scenario.
Additionally, there are inferential reasons to believe that the attrition might actually cause
the sample to understate the impact of the cash transfer. The households most likely to
dissolve, the children most likely to die, and the households least likely to retain children
are all likely to be associated with poor health.

4.7 Results of Lee Bounds Testing

Two different specifications for the Lee Bounds test were used. First, the tests
were done with weights generated from propensity scores. Secondly, the Lee Bounds
tests were performed without any weights. The results are broadly similar across both
specifications and are found in Table 6 and Table 7.

14

The Lee Bounds test relies on only two assumptions. The first assumption is independence or random
assignment. This assumption is fulfilled by the Malawi SCTS. The second assumption is monotonicity
which means that the treatment should only affect sample selection in one direction.
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The only variable that retains its significance even under the ‘worst case’ scenario
is the reduction in children who did not seek treatment because they lacked money. The
Lee Bounds test does undermine the robustness of the results presented earlier, but there
are several important factors to keep in mind. First of all, there is supposed to be random
assignment for Lee Bounds tests. The Malawi Social Cash Transfer was imperfectly
randomized and therefore this will introduce additional ‘noise’ to the Lee Bounds results.
For Lee Bounds testing, it is not possible to use controls. These controls might eliminate
some of the noise, especially since multiple econometric techniques and specifications
were used. Secondly, it must be remembered that the bounds generated represent best and
worst case scenarios and even under the worst case scenario several other of the results
were close to achieving statistical significance.
Finally, there are inferential reasons to believe that the worst case scenario is
unlikely. As previously noted, the cash transfer incentivizes households to keep children
and improvements to health might make other forms of attrition more likely. On the other
hand, children in the counterfactual who are lost due to attrition might be more likely to
have poor health. Poor health increases the likelihood of attrition due to death.
Constraints on the resources of a household increase the likelihood of children leaving
due to lack of resources (for example possibly moving into a relative’s household). These
hypotheses need to be empirically examined, but they do provide prima facie evidence
that the worst case scenario is unlikely.
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5. Conclusion

As cash transfers become more and more prevalent, it is increasingly important to
understand exactly how they work. This paper tries to answer two main questions. First
of all, I examine whether the increased purchasing power of the cash transfer can
improve the health outcomes for children even when there are weak supply side
institutions. Secondly, I check the hypothesis that women have systematically different
preferences than men for investment in the human capital of their children. I use several
different econometric techniques (Difference-in-difference, propensity score matching,
and Lee Bounds) in order to ensure the robustness of my results. By answering these two
questions, I am trying to help provide additional evidence about how to best design cash
transfer programs and the conditions under which they are most effective.
It is important for policy makers to know if cash transfers can be effective even in
the absence of supply side institutions as cash transfer become increasingly prevalent.
This paper shows that cash transfers can be effective even in the absence of adequate
supply side institutions. The cash transfer reduced the frequency of illnesses significantly
and reduced the impact of sicknesses on the households. Additionally, it removed barriers
to accessing care. On the other hand, the lack of anthropometric results hints that other
approaches should be taken in combination with cash transfers. Luckily, many programs
already do this by distributing fortified products along with the cash transfer.
Oportunidades is one prime example. The program provides nutritional supplements to
infants between six and twenty three months of age as well as to undernourished children
between twenty-four and fifty-nine months old. Van de Gaer et al. (2012) and Gertler
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(2004) both found significant positive impacts of the Oportunidades program on
anthropometric measurements.
Additionally, this paper shows that care must be taken when deciding who
receives the transfer. In Latin America, most of the programs are targeted towards
females. However, in the Malawi SCTS, female-headed households produced similar
results to male-headed households. There are costs associated with targeting the transfers
exclusively towards females; it means some male families are excluded and it might
reinforce traditional gender standards that view the female as being in charge of the
domestic sphere. The female-headed households in Malawi have to manage more general
household responsibilities including production and do not seem to have systematically
different preferences than the male headed households. This result provides evidence that
the culture and societal conditions must be taken into consideration rather than assuming
that females automatically have different expenditure preferences centered on traditional
domestic roles.
Even though these results hold for multiple specifications that these issues are far
from resolved. The results pertain to certain cultural (gender norms) and societal
conditions (supply side institutions and governance). A fruitful area for future research
would be to examine how strong of a role culture plays in determining gender
preferences. The Lee Bounds results also show that the effect of cash transfers on
household stability should be examined. With so many people living in poverty
worldwide, it is critical to continue to rigorously assess poverty alleviation programs in
order to determine the most effective approaches.
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Tables

TABLE 1: Baseline Characteristics
Overall sample

Eligibility Criteria
0-1 Meals per Day (0/1)

Overall

Contro
l

0.527

0.508

Propensity score adjusted sample

Treat

Test
(pval)

Control

Treat

Test
(p-val)

0.548

0.271

.0.568

0.546

0.645

HH Member Begs (0/1)

0.382

0.329

0.438

0.435

0.704

192.434

193.304

191.513

0.002
0.938

0.453

Monthly Exp. (Kw/capita)

155.412

191.913

0.135

0-1 Assets (0/1)

0.503

0.523

0.482

0.261

0.510

0.485

0.572

Dep. Ratio Over 3 (0/1)

0.393

0.326

0.463

0.000

0.470

0.462

0.850

Orphans (number)

0.551

0.383

0.729

0.000

0.605

0.702

0.409

Household characteristics
Head education (years)

1.587

1.205

1.992

0.000

2.032

1.953

0.740

Over 60 (0/1)

0.597

0.650

0.540

0.002

0.537

0.538

0.984

Household size (number)

4.091

3.541

4.671

0.000

4.643

4.593

0.742

Children (number)

2.463

1.979

2.975

0.000

2.941

2.928

0.933

Members aged 0-5 (number)

0.425

0.376

0.477

0.062

0.461

0.476

0.808

Members aged 5-10 (number)

0.800

0.630

0.981

0.000

0.928

0.964

0.637

Members aged 11-15 (number)

0.951

0.759

1.153

0.000

1.160

1.133

0.794

Members aged 15-59 (number)

1.136

0.933

1.351

0.000

1.340

1.320

0.855

Members aged 60+ (number)

0.779

0.845

0.710

0.005

0.691

0.699

0.890

Natural Shock (0/1)

0.609

0.573

0.647

0.038

0.602

0.649

0.680

N

751

386

365

114.342
0.506

113.105
0.530

115.286
0.489

0.398
0.093

115.45
.49285

115.64
.52941

0.939

0.219
1732

0.185
750

0.245
982

0.005

.22635

.22911

0.893

Child Characteristics
Age (months)
Male (0/1)
Orphan (0/1)
N

0.119
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TABLE 2-Pre-Treatment Dependent Variables
Control
Child Health
Sick in the Past Month (0/1)
Malaria in Last Month (0/1)
Ill over a Month (0/1)
Sought Treatment (0/1)
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1)
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1)
# of Days Stopped (Days)
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care (0/1)
# of Days Stopped (Days)
Weight in Kg
Height in Cm
N

0.669
0.095
0.082
0.051
0.010
0.498
5.012
0.430
5.346
25.653
122.720
750

Before Treatment
Intervention Ttest (p-value) Control
0.650
0.094
0.075
0.101
0.039
0.457
5.204
0.462
5.638
25.670
122.252
982

(0.420)
(0.945)
(0.637)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.106)
(0.583)
(0.310)
(0.561)
(0.977)
(0.713)

0.541
0.069
0.039
0.105
0.044
0.386
5.292
0.628
5.265
28.268
126.588
750

After Treatment
Intervention Ttest (p-value)
0.422
0.061
0.021
0.042
0.000
0.281
4.681
0.523
4.946
28.687
128.104
982

(0.000)
(0.490)
(0.022)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.133)
(0.011)
(0.578)
(0.503)
(0.194)

TABLE 3-Pre-Treatment Child Variables by HH Head Gender

Sick in the Past Month (0/1)
Malaria in Last Month (0/1)
Ill over a Month (0/1)
Didn’t Seek Treatment (0/1)
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1)
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1)
# of Days Stopped (Days)
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care (0/1)
# of Days Stopped (Days)
Weight in Kg
Height in Cm
N

Control
Intervention
Male HH Head Female HH Head Male HH Head Female HH Head
0.589
0.704
0.626
0.668
0.113
0.087
0.102
0.09
0.053
0.094
0.058
0.086
0.043
0.055
0.1
0.102
0.005
0.013
0.021
0.049
0.44
0.523
0.457
0.459
4.133
5.328
5.231
5.202
0.478
0.412
0.511
0.436
3.897
5.992
5.435
5.784
25.685
25.639
25.95
25.518
121.861
123.084
122.375
122.159
230
520
363
613
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TABLE 4- General Results for Impact on Child Health

Sick in the Past Month (0/1)
Malaria in Last Month (0/1)
Ill over a Month (0/1)
Did not Seek Treatment (0/1)
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1)
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1)
# of Days Stopped (Days)
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care
(0/1)
# of Days Stopped (Days)
Weight for age (z-score)
Height for age (z-score)
BMI for age (z-score)
N=

DD
-0.092**
(0.043)
-0.018
(0.020)
-0.027*
(0.014)
-0.064***
(0.015)
0.028
(0.020)
-0.064
(0.041)
-0.710**
(0.291)

Kernel
PSM
-0.134***
(0.034)
-0.030
(0.023)
-0.028
(0.019)
-0.092***
(0.027)
-0.081***
(0.016)
-0.131***
(0.037)
-1.025***
(0.313)

-0.131***
(0.03)
-0.716***
(0.254)
-0.065
(0.052)
0.002
(0.028)
-0.014
(0.027)

-0.152***
(0.032)
-0.988***
(0.306)
-0.038
(0.044)
-0.001
(0.027)
0.001
(0.021)

1732
* =p<0.1 ** =p<0.05 ***= p<0.01
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TABLE 5- Differences in Impacts between Female and Male Headed Households

Sick in the Past Month (0/1)
Malaria in Last Month (0/1)
Ill over a Month (0/1)
Did not Seek Treatment (0/1)
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1)
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1)
# of Days Stopped (Days)
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care
(0/1)
# of Days Stopped (Days)
Weight for age (z-score)
Height for age (z-score)
BMI for age (z-score)
N= 1732
* =p<0.1 ** =p<0.05 ***= p<0.01

DD
0.070
(0.055)
0.071**
(0.029)
0.006
(0.023)
-0.023
(0.029)
0.009
(0.032)
-0.001
(0.053)
-0.174
(0.426)
.014
(0.046)
-0.088
(0.367)
-0.022
(0.213)
-0.265
(0.169)
0.046
(0.118)
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TABLE 6- Lee Bounds Results with Weighting
Lower
Bound
Sick in the Past Month (0/1)
-0.184***
Malaria in the Last Month (0/1)
-0.082**
Ill over a Month
-0.071***
Did not Seek Treatment
-0.170***
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1)
-0.098***
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1)
-0.176***
# of Days Stopped (Days)
-1.616***
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care (0/1)
-0.200***
# of Days Stopped (Days)
-1.616***
Weight for Age (Z-Score)
-0.017
Height for Age (Z-Score)
-0.002
BMI for Age (Z-Score)
-0.041
N=
1747
* =p<0.1 ** =p<0.05 ***= p<0.01

Upper
Bound
-0.049
0.035
0.015
-0.019
-0.037***
-0.019
0.134
-0.043
-0.028
0.000
0.032
0.023

TABLE 7- Lee Bounds Results without Weighting
Lower
Bound
Sick in the Past Month (0/1)
-0.174***
Malaria in the Last Month (0/1)
-0.064***
Ill over a Month
-0.068***
Did not Seek Treatment
-0.168***
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1)
-0.089***
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1)
-0.143***
# of Days Stopped (Days)
-1.553***
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care (0/1)
-0.171***
# of Days Stopped (Days)
-1.467***
Weight for Age (Z-Score)
-0.105
Height for Age (Z-Score)
-0.048
BMI for Age (Z-Score)\
-0.052*
N=
1747
* =p<0.1 ** =p<0.05 ***= p<0.01

Upper
Bound
-0.046
0.044**
0.020
-0.039
-0.031***
0.006
0.203
-0.022
0.104
-0.029
0.041
0.028
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Annex 1: Probit Results for Propensity Score Estimation
Child
0-1 Meals per Day (0/1)

0.128
(1.87)

HH Member Begs (0/1)

0.0825
(0.61)

Monthly Exp. (Kw/capita)

0.000285
(1.53)

0-1 Assets (0/1)

-0.198**
(-2.74)

Dep. Ratio Over 3 (0/1)

-0.340**
(-2.61)

Orphans (number)

0.210***

Head education (years)

0.0442**

(4.53)
(2.75)
Head over 60 (0/1)

0.476*
(2.55)

Household Size (number)

0.239
(1.57)

Children (number)

-0.0567
(-0.64)

Members aged 0-5 (number)

-0.142
(-0.95)

Members aged 5-10
(number)

0.175
(1.14)

Members aged 11-15
(number)

0.00325
(0.02)

Members aged 15-59
(number)

0.0893
(0.64)

Natural Shock (0/1)

0.254**
(2.97)

Head over 60*Members
aged 60+

-0.402*
(-2.14)

Log household size
(number)

-0.568

Log dependency ratio

0.508***

(-1.16)
(3.44)
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Log of age (months)

-0.00113
(-0.01)

Over 65 yrs. Old*Education

0.0139
(0.38)

HH begs*Natural Shock

0.132

Age (months)

0.000128

(0.83)
(0.07)
Male (0/1)

-0.0865

Orphan (0/1)

-0.414*

(-1.29)
(-2.54)
Constant

-1.079
(-1.87)

N
t statistics in parentheses
* =p<0.05 ** =p<0.01
***= p<0.001
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